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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Overview of this Appeal
This appeal arises from the post-foreclosure ejectment of Defendant/Appellants Brian and

Tammi Kincaid (“the Kincaids”), which in turn followed the non-judicial foreclosure of real
property occupied by the Kincaids located at 142 Wolverine Road, Moyie Springs, Idaho (the
“Property”). As part of the ejectment proceedings, the district court denied in part and granted in
part the Kincaids’ objection to an award of costs and attorney fees to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(“Wells Fargo”). The Kincaids appealed from the district court’s Order Granting in Part and
Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion to Disallow and Order Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs
to Plaintiff.1
The Kincaids are doing nothing more in this appeal than simply inviting this court to
second-guess the trial court. The Kincaids identify no error in the proceedings below and
provide no analysis or allegation that the trial court wrongly determined facts or improperly
applied settled law. Citing only to a single statute which has no bearing on the facts of this case
(and on an argument which was not made below), the Kincaids utterly fail to identify or cite any
statutory or case law authority to support their appeal.
In a transparent attempt to manufacture a disputed issue of fact on appeal, the Kincaids
attach two “affidavits” as exhibits to their opening brief on appeal. The affidavits were not

1 See Notice of Appeal, R. Vol. II, pp. 344-346 and see Amended Notice of Appeal, R. Vol. II,
pp. 348-350. As is discussed below, the Kincaids seem to argue that the district court’s refusal to
reconsider its decision on Wells Fargo’s summary judgment motion is also an issue on appeal.
Even though that issue is not before the Court on the basis of the Notice of Appeal and Amended
Notice of Appeal, it will be treated by Wells Fargo as an “additional issue on appeal”.
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF - 1
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presented to the trial court below and they directly and materially contradict affidavits which
were filed with the trial court. Of note, the affidavits are not information which was even
available to be provided to the court below; they were created and are dated as of the date of the
filing of the Kincaids’ opening brief. They are not part of the proceedings below, and they are
not properly part of the record on appeal. They should be stricken from this court’s record.
The course of proceedings below is relatively uncomplicated. Wells Fargo, as
beneficiary of a deed of trust on the Property, caused the trustee to initiate a non-judicial
foreclosure and set a sale date of December 17, 2015. This sale was postponed, as provided in
Idaho statutes, to January 14, 2016, and then postponed again to February 28, 2016. Recorded
Affidavits of Mailing, as required by Idaho Code Section 45-1506(8), confirmed the
postponements of these sales. The sale was conducted on February 28, 2016, with Wells Fargo
being the highest bidder. A Trustee’s Deed was issued to Wells Fargo and recorded on February
4, 2016. All of these facts were found to be undisputed by the district court. See generally R.,
Vol. II, pp. 218-222.
Defendant Respondent Wells Fargo filed its ejectment action on March 18, 2016 (R. Vol.
I, p. 12). The Kincaids, through counsel, filed an answer on April 22, 2016 (R. Vol I, p. 18), and
later filed an amended answer and counterclaim on June 27, 2016 (R. Vol I., p 93). Neither the
original answer nor the amended answer and counterclaim challenged the public announcement
of the postponement of the trustees sales on December 17, 2015 and January 14, 2016. The
Kincaid’s counterclaim alleged only that the “sale was purportedly postponed beyond the
statutory authority for postponement”, i.e., that the sale was postponed for too long of a period of
time. This argument was apparently based on the Kincaids’ counsel’s mistaken belief that the
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sale had been postponed from December 17, 2015 to February 28, 2016, and his lack of
awareness that Wells Fargo had in fact also postponed the January 14, 2016 sale date.
Following filing of the Kincaid’s answer and counterclaim, Wells Fargo filed a motion
for summary judgment on May 2, 2016 (R. Vol. I, pp. 31-97). The motion was supported by
various affidavits, some filed in supplement of the original filing at various dates throughout the
summer of 2016 (R. Vol. I, pp. 118-142; 183-206).
The Kincaids, through their then-engaged counsel, filed responsive memoranda and
affidavits opposing the motion for summary judgment. In their September 26, 2016
memorandum opposing the motion for summary judgment – filed just ten (10) days before the
scheduled hearing -- the Kincaids raised for the first time the allegation that the trustee had
failed to make a public announcement of the postponements. This claim, which apparently forms
the basis of the Kincaids’ current appeal, was ultimately rejected by the district court on the basis
that it was not properly raised in the answer and counterclaim. The district court further noted
that even if it were to consider the allegation that the trustee failed to make a public
announcement of the postponements, the Kincaids had completely failed to include any facts in
the record to support it. (R. Vol. II, p. 224). The only basis for claiming that no oral notice of
postponement had been made was their counsel’s argument that no such notice had been made.
(R. Vol. I, p. 145). The Kincaids filed no affidavits or testimony alleging that oral notice of the
postponement had not been made.2

2

The Kincaids’ opposition included an affidavit of Mr. Kincaid, yet he did not make any
statement about oral notice of postponement. This initial affidavit made no reference to Mr.
Kincaid even attending the sale. (R. Vol. I, pp. 162-167).

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF - 3
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After oral argument on Wells Fargo’s summary judgment motion, the district court issued
a thirty-two (32) page Memorandum Decision and Order detailing the facts, issues and
controlling authorities for the issues raised by the parties. The district court reviewed each
defense raised by the Kincaids and found them either legally deficient or factually unsupported
(or factually erroneous). The district court similarly found that each counterclaim raised by the
Kincaids was fatally deficient, and dismissed those counterclaims. The district court found that
Wells Fargo was entitled to an order of ejectment. Finally, the district court found that the
Kincaids’ defenses and counterclaims were brought frivolously, unreasonably and without
foundation, and awarded Wells Fargo its attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12121. (R. Vol. II, pp. 214-246)
After entry of the district court’s memorandum decision and order, the Kincaids, again
acting through their counsel, filed a motion for the district court to reconsider its decision, and to
allow the Kincaids to amend their answer and counterclaim and conduct discovery. The
Kincaids expressly argued that discovery would allow them to develop facts which they could
then use to oppose Wells Fargo’s summary judgment motion. See R. Vol. II, p. 258. In support
of this motion for reconsideration and to amend, the Kincaids –for the first time—filed an
affidavit which purported to claim that Mr. Kincaid had attended the location of the January 28,
2016 sale date and could find no one conducting or postponing a sale. (R. Vol. II, pp. 272-274).
That affidavit also detailed that rather than stay at the location specified in the sale notice, Mr.
Kincaid had wandered in and out of the Boundary County courthouse to speak with staff to see if
anyone knew anything about a trustee’s sale. Id.

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF - 4
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The district court denied the motion to reconsider and to amend, and detailed its
reasoning in a twenty-two (22) page written memorandum decision and order. (R. Vol. II, pp.
307-328). This is the order the Kincaids claim as being improperly issued by the district court
below.3
B.

Statement of the Facts
The statement of facts in this case are undisputed, and are as follows4:
1. On June 19, 2003, Brian Kincaid executed a Note secured by a Deed of Trust in the

amount of $102,000 on the real property located at 142 Wolverine Road, Moyie Springs, Idaho
83845.
2. On May 23, 2014, Casper J. Rankin, Esq., a member of the State Bar of Idaho, of Pite
Duncan, LLP, was appointed as successor trustee by an Appointment of Successor Trustee,
recorded as Instrument No. 260822, of the records of Boundary County, Idaho. Counsel
Affidavit, at Ex. B.
3. On February 19, 2015, a Notice of Default was recorded by the Successor Trustee in
the records of Boundary County, Idaho, as Instrument No. 262985, noting a failure to pay the
monthly payments due from July 1, 2011, and each month thereafter; and that the trust property
would be sold to satisfy said obligation. Complaint, at Ex. A, p. 1, ¶ 1; Counsel Affidavit, at Ex.
C; Kincaid Affidavit, at p. 3, ¶ 13.

3
4

The Kincaids do not specifically identify as an issue on appeal that the district court’s
memorandum decision and order granting summary judgment was in error; just that they
“disagree” with the district court’s denial of their motion to amend and to allow discovery.
These facts are all found in the record at R., Vol. II, pp. 218-222. All of the following
numbered paragraphs correspond with the findings of fact made by the district court, and are
restated here for ease of reference.

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF - 5
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4. The Successor Trustee then gave notice of the time and place of the sale of the
Property by registered or certified mail, by personal service upon occupants of the Property, by
posting in a conspicuous place on the Property, and by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in the county in which the Property is located. Complaint, at Ex. A, p. 2, Ex. 2. An
Affidavit of Mailing confirming the same was recorded on September 24, 2015, as Instrument
No. 265110, of the records of Boundary County, Idaho. The Affidavit of Mailing, as recorded,
included: (i) Notice of Trustee's Sale, setting the sale at 12/17/2015, 10:00a.m., at the Boundary
County Courthouse; (ii) Recipient List (addresses); (iii) Affidavit of Publication, showing the
Notice of Trustee's Sale was published for four consecutive weeks in the Bonners Ferry Herald;
(iv) Affidavit of Service and/or Posting, showing the Notice of Trustee's Sale was posted on the
Property and personally served on "Tami Kincaid." Complaint, at Ex. A, p. 2, ¶ 3; Counsel
Affidavit, at Ex. D.
5. An "Affidavit of Compliance with Idaho Code Section 45-1506C" from the Successor
Trustee was recorded on January 5, 2016, as Instrument No. 266000, of the records of Boundary
County, Idaho, noting that the Successor Trustee had complied with 45-1506C by providing the
notice required in section 45-1506C(1), and the loan modification request form required in 451506C(2). Counsel Affidavit, at Ex. E.
6. An "Affidavit of Beneficiary Compliance" was recorded on January 5, 2016, as
Instrument No. 266001, of the records of Boundary County, Idaho, noting that Wells Fargo had
complied with 45-1506C by: (i) providing the notice required in section 45-1506C(1), (ii)
providing the loan modification request form required in 45-1506C(2); (iii) evaluating the
request for modification and providing a written response to the request, as required in 45-
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1506C(3); and (iv) if requested, scheduling, and if attended by the grantor of the Deed of Trust,
attending, in person or by telephone, the meeting required in 45-1506C(4). Counsel Affidavit, at
Ex. E.
7. On February 10, 2015, the Successor Trustee mailed copies of the Notice of Default
and of the 45-1506C Notices to the defendants in the same envelope by certified mail, postage
prepaid. Affidavit of Trustee in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (filed September 29,
2016) ("Trustee Affidavit"), at ¶ 6, and Ex. A. The 45-1506C Notices included a blank loan
modification request form, which instructed the homeowner to complete and return the form by
3/15/2015. Id. at Ex. A. The envelope containing both Notices was delivered to the defendants
by the U.S. Postal Service on February 17, 2015. Id. at ¶ 7, and Ex. B; Kincaid Affidavit, at p.
3,1113.
8. Mr. Kincaid filled out the blank loan modification request form he received on
February 17, 2015. He signed the form and dated it 2/24/15; and then, mailed it back to the
Successor Trustee. Id. at Ex. C. The form that Mr. Kincaid filled out was received back by the
Successor Trustee on March 2, 2015. Id. at ¶ 8.
9. The Trustee's sale of the Property that was scheduled for December 17, 2015, was
postponed until 1/14/2016, 10:00 a.m., at the Boundary County Courthouse; and an "Affidavit of
Mailing Idaho Code Section 45-1506(8) " confirming the same was recorded on December 30,
2015, as Instrument No. 265963, of the records of Boundary County, Idaho. Supplemental
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (filed August 3, 2016), at Ex.
G. The Affidavit of Mailing, as recorded, included as attachments: (i) Notice of Postponing
Trustee's Sale; and (ii) Recipient List (addresses).
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10. The Trustee's sale of the Property that was scheduled for January 14, 2016, was
postponed until 1/28/2016, 10:00 a.m., at the Boundary County Courthouse; and an "Affidavit of
Mailing Idaho Code Section 45-1506(8)" confirming the same was recorded on January 27,
2016, as Instrument No. 266170, of the records of Boundary County, Idaho. Counsel Affidavit,
at Ex. F. The Affidavit of Mailing, as recorded, included as attachments: (i) Notice of
Postponing Trustee's Sale; and (ii) Recipient List (addresses).
11. Brian T. Kincaid sought to have his loan reviewed for possible modification.
However, he failed to ever submit a completed application with all the materials required to
review his loan. Affidavit of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (filed August 3, 2016) at ¶ 5, and Ex. A; Kincaid Affidavit, at p. 4, ¶ 16. By letter
from Wells Fargo dated July 20, 2015, Mr. Kincaid was notified that because he had not
provided all of the required documentation, the Bank was unable to offer him assistance, and that
if he wished to continue the loan review process, he should contact the Bank. Id.
12. Wells Fargo sent a second letter to Mr. Kincaid dated January 7, 2016, reminding him
of the date of the Trustee's sale and advising him that the Bank still had not heard from him or
received the necessary documentation required to determine his eligibility for mortgage
assistance, and that because of his failure to provide all of the necessary documentation required
to determine whether he was eligible for mortgage assistance, his loan could not be reviewed
prior to the sale date. Id at ¶ 6, and Ex. B.
13. Mr. Kincaid failed to tender sufficient funds to either cure the delinquency on his loan
or to pay his loan off prior to the date of the January 28, 2016, Trustee's sale. Id. at ¶ 7.
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14. When the Trustee's sale was held on January 28, 2016, Wells Fargo was the highest
bidder and a Trustee's Deed was issued to Wells Fargo and recorded on February 4, 2016, as
Instrument No. 266219, of the records of Boundary County, Idaho. Complaint, at Ex. A; Wells
Fargo Affidavit, at ¶ 1.
15. Notwithstanding the Trustee's sale and the issuance and recording of a Trustee's Deed
in favor of Wells Fargo, the defendants continue to occupy the Property and are refusing to
relinquish possession. Answer, at ¶ 1; Complaint, at II.
II.
ISSUES ON APPEAL/ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.

Issues on appeal identified by the Kincaids.
The Kincaids’ statement of issues presented on appeal are so brief and conclusory as to

be almost inexplicable. None present a clear or cogent identification of error of law or fact
below. With such a deficient statement of issues on appeal, Wells Fargo is left to speculate what
arguments the Kincaids are attempting to advance on appeal, or the factual and legal basis for
those arguments.
Rule 35(a)(4), I.A.R., provides that an appellant's failure to include in his initial appellate
brief a fair statement of an issue presented for review results in waiver of the issue. However,
this Court has stated this rule will be relaxed when the issue is supported by argument in the
briefs. See Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 525, 272 P.3d 491, 497
(2012), [citing State v. Crowe, 131 Idaho 109, 111, 952 P.2d 1245, 1247 (1998.] This Court has
clarified that its statement in Crowe should have included the qualification that the issue must be
addressed in the appellant's opening brief. See Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc., 152
Idaho 519, 525, 272 P.3d 491, 497 (2012). Rule 35(a)(6), I.A.R., requires that the opening brief
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"contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the
reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record
relied upon." Thus, this Court has repeatedly stated that it will not consider an issue not
supported by argument and authority in the opening brief. See e.g., Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho
372, 374, 234 P.3d 696, 698 (2010). The Kincaids do not supplement any of their statements on
appeal with argument in their brief, supported by authority, and accordingly should not have the
benefit of the Weisel exception.
For example, even the clearest of the Kincaids’ statement of the issues – “Disagree with
order denying motion for new discovery & reconsideration” – fails to identify what was incorrect
or otherwise erroneous about the district court’s decision. It is not the duty of this Court to
review the record for errors. See Everhart v. Washington County Road and Bridge Dept., 130
Idaho 273, 939 P.2d 849, (1997) [citing Jensen v. Doherty, 101 Idaho 910, 911, 623 P.2d 1287,
1288 (1981).] However, that rule may be relaxed if the briefing addressed an issue through
authority or argument. Id. [citing State v. Prestwich, 116 Idaho 959,[939 P.2d 851] 961, 783 P.2d
298, 300 (1989) overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 985-87,
842 P.2d 660, 664-65 (1992))].
Here, the Kincaids utterly fail to provide any briefing, authority or argument which
addresses any of the topics which are listed under the heading of “Issues Presented on Appeal”.
Having failed to identify any issues on appeal, this Court should properly decline to review the
actions of the district court below. Id. While this result may seem harsh, particularly for pro se
appellants, this court has repeatedly noted that pro se appellants are not entitled to special
consideration or leniency because they represent themselves. To the contrary, it is well-
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established that courts will apply the same standards and rules whether or not a party is
represented by an attorney and that pro se litigants must follow the same rules, including the
rules of procedure. Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 229, 220 P.3d 580, 585 (2009) (citations
and quotations omitted); Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 709, 117 P.3d 120, 123 (2005); Twin Falls
Cnty. v. Coates, 139 Idaho 442, 445, 80 P.3d 1043, 1046 (2003). Further, “[p]ro se litigants are
held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney.” Trotter v. Bank of New
York Mellon, 152 Idaho 842, 846, 275 P.3d 857, 861 (2012) (quoting Twin Falls Cnty. v. Coates,
139 Idaho 442, 445, 80 P.3d 1043, 1046 (2003)).
B.

Additional Issues on Appeal
Wells Fargo is hesitant to attempt to interpret the Kincaids’ “issues presented on appeal”,

restate them into a more cognizable form, and respond to them and thereby cause the Court to
conclude that with such clarification, the Court could make an analysis on appeal. See, e.g.,
Everhart, supra at 939 P.2d 851 (“While [the appellant] did not cite any authority regarding the
denial of the motion to continue, she did make an argument on the issue; she also provided
argument and authority on the motion to dismiss. Both parties discussed the factual background
in sufficient detail that we can decide the issues…”). The Kincaids’ briefing should be
disregarded for failing to comply with I.A.R. 35(a)(4). Wells Fargo should not be penalized for
providing this alternative analysis, attempt to divine the issues the Kincaids attempt to raise and
thereby cause the Court to assume it can decide the issues, as was the case in Everhart.
Unfortunately, Wells Fargo cannot help but incur the additional cost and time to decode the
Kincaids arguments in order to provide the Court with analysis which fairly meets those assumed
issues—should the Court take them up.
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Wells Fargo is also loathe to avoid presenting to the Court an analysis of why the district
court below correctly decided each and every issue placed before it. Accordingly, while Wells
Fargo believes this Court should decline to address the Kincaids’ appeal --at all for failure to
specify their issues on appeal, the following statement of issues on appeal should be decided if
the Court decides to undertake a substantive analysis of this appeal:
1. Did the district court properly decline to allow the motion for reconsideration
and disallow additional discovery?
2. Did the district court properly dispose of the Kincaids’ argument that they made
payments in September or July of 2011?
3. Were alleged sale notices from October of 2012 and September of 2013 of any
relevance to the district court’s decisions below?
4. Did the Kincaids raise below the issue of an “original note, required to travel
with deed of trust. Didn’t.”?
5. Did the Kincaids raise below the issue of “two years with no billing statements,
2012 & 2013, intentional delay”?
6. Did the Kincaids raise below the issues of “affidavits signed by S.T.O.C. agents
(2) simply not true statements,” and “notary stamps with forged signatures”?
7. Did the Kincaids raise below the application and relevance of Idaho Code § 451601?
8. Is the “attorney fee’s appellant paid to attorney John Finney” of any relevance to
any issue below or on appeal?
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III.
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL
Wells Fargo is entitled to its attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code
§12-121 in that this appeal is brought frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. The
provisions of Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2(a) should also compel an award of attorney fees and
costs in Wells Fargo’s favor, in that the briefing submitted by the Kincaids is not “well grounded
in fact” and is not “warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.” Indeed, contrary to the proscriptions of I.A.R. 11.2(a),
the Kincaids’ briefing appears to be “interposed . . . to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.”
A.

Standard of Review
The Kincaids do not challenge the district court’s Memorandum Decision and Order

Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Rather, their Notice of Appeal and
Amended Notice of Appeal make quite clear that they appeal only the district court’s Order
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Disallow and Order Awarding
Attorney’s Fees and Costs to Plaintiff, entered on December 12, 2016. Based on the notices of
appeal, no challenge is made to the original summary judgment ruling.
The Kincaids’ opening brief, however, clearly indicates that they “Disagree with order
denying motion for new discovery & reconsideration.” Moreover, Idaho Appellate Rule
17(e)(A) would include all interlocutory judgments and orders entered prior to the order
appealed from. Even so, the Kincaids’ appellate briefing does not indicate any challenge to the
summary judgment ruling.
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This distinction is important in that this Court exercises de novo review of summary
judgment decisions, but uses an “exercise of discretion” standard in reviewing an order denying
or granting a motion for reconsideration. In an appeal from an order granting summary
judgment, this Court “exercises de novo review of a grant of summary judgment and the standard
of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment.” Holdaway v. Broulim’s Supermarket, 349 P.3d 1197, 1200 (Idaho 2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In contrast, The decision to grant or deny a request for
reconsideration generally rests in the sound discretion of the trial court." See Campbell v.
Reagan, 144 Idaho 254, 159 P.3d 891, (2007), Carnell v. Barker Mgmt. Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 329,
48 P.3d 651, 658 (2002).
Because the Kincaids specifically appeal only from the Order Granting in Part and
Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Disallow and Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees and Costs
to Plaintiff, and because their briefing on appeal only indicates “disagreement” with the “order
denying motion for new discovery & reconsideration,” the standard to be applied in this appeal is
whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration.5
Under the “abuse of discretion” standard, this Court applies a three-part test: “[t]he test
to determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion . . . consists of three parts asking
whether the trial court: "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
5 Wells Fargo would prevail on appeal using a de novo standard even if the Kincaids had
challenged the original summary judgment ruling in this appeal because the district court’s
decision was in all respects correct. The Kincaids have also failed to identify any error with
the court’s summary judgment ruling, and have further failed to support any assignment of
error with briefing, argument or citation.
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specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Parks v.
Safeco Ins. Co., 160 Idaho 556, 562, 376 P.3d 760, 766 (2016) (quoting Marek v. Lawrence, 153
Idaho 50, 53, 278 P.3d 920, 923 (2012)).
B.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying The Request for
Reconsideration.
The district court’s conclusions reached in its twenty-two (22) page Memorandum

Decision and Order Denying Defendants’ Motions to Reconsider, to Amend Responsive
Pleading, and to allow Additional Limited Discovery did not abuse the court’s discretion. First,
the district court correctly – and expressly – recognized that the standard was one of the court’s
discretion. See R., Vol. II, pp. 310-311. The district court recognized that in connection with a
motion for reconsideration, it must consider any new evidence presented. Id. The court fully
grappled with the issues presented by the Kincaids’ motion to reconsider in light of the “new”
evidence they proffered (an affidavit of Mr. Kincaid stating for the first time that he attempted to
locate the January 28, 2016 sale and was unable to do so), and accordingly fully acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion. The district court carefully detailed the applicable legal
standards to each facet of the request for reconsideration – the “new” evidence of Mr. Kincaid’s
affidavit, supra, and the claim that the lack of affirmative evidence of announcement of
postponements called for a remedy of quiet title subject to the debt and the security (R. Vol. II,
pp. 319-320). The court plainly reached each of these decisions by exercise of reason,
meticulously documented in the written memorandum decision. It did not abuse its discretion,
and its decision should be upheld on appeal.
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C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying the Motion to Amend
The district court carefully examined each claim the Kincaids sought to add by their

motion to amend, and for each such claim, clearly articulated that the standard was one of
discretion, identified and applied specific Idaho law related to each such claim, and reached its
decision on each through a reasoned and well articulated application of the law to the facts.
Ultimately, the district court found that the claimed amendments were either futile or made in
bad faith. See R., Vol. II, pp. 321-326.
D.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion to Deny Additional Discovery.
As the district court found that the amendments sought to be made were either futile or in

bad faith, the Kincaids’ request to seek additional discovery in support of those claims was
denied. As a discretionary decision, the district court’s decisions were well within the outer
boundaries of that discretion. See R. Vol. II, pp. 326.
E.

The District Court Properly Rejected the Kincaids’ Claims that Payments Allegedly
Made in 2011 Precluded the Non-judicial Foreclosure.
The Kincaids claimed – with only the bald statement by Mr. Kincaid, unsupported by

any evidence or proof – that two payments (one each in July and September of 2011) were not
reflected by Wells Fargo, and that thus the Notice of Default recorded on February 19, 2015 was
deficient because a recitation of a default for payment of the monthly payments from July 1,
2011and each month thereafter was incorrect. See R. Vol. I, p. 146.
The Kincaids attempt on appeal to bolster their factually-deficient showing below by
submitting two documents attached to their opening brief as Exhibit A as “proof” of payments
made. These documents were not contained in the record below, and should not be considered
on appeal. The Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. See The
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Watkins Co., LLC v. Estate of Storms, 390 P.3d 409, 411 (2017); Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v.
Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 812, 252 P.3d 71, 93 (2011). Moreover, it is impossible from
reviewing these documents to determine if payments were actually being made, what was being
paid, when the payments were made, what accounts were debited or credited or indeed any other
foundational information regarding the alleged payments. One of the documents is so poorly
copied as to be entirely illegible. These attachments are simply extraneous hearsay documents
improperly placed in this court’s record.
The existence – or not – of a claimed payment in July and September of 2011 has no
materiality or relevance upon the district court’s decision below. The district court noted that
Mr. Kincaid freely admitted that he had not made a payment on the loan since 2011. See R. Vol.
II, p. 227. The district court also noted that the Notice of Default specifically provided that it
was for the failure to make payments from July, 2011 and each month thereafter. See R. Vol. II,
p. 226. The district court properly determined that a precondition of non-judicial foreclosure was
the recording of a notice of default, the existence of a default in payment, and the failure to cure
the default before sale. See R. Vol. II, pp. 226-228.
The district court then found that each of these preconditions were unquestionably
admitted, and that Idaho Code §45-1505 authorized a non-judicial foreclosure sale in such
circumstances. Whether the Notice of Default was correct in specifying that the default started
in July of 2011 or in the month or two later was irrelevant to the validity of the sale. By the time
the Notice of Default was recorded, the Kincaids had not made a single payment in nearly four
years. Even more shockingly, Mr. Kincaid’s affidavit readily admitted to this long period of
non-payment. There is no question that a substantial, years-long monetary default existed at the
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time of the recording of the Notice of Default, and that the Kincaids failed to cure the default
before the date of sale.
F.

Purported sales noted for October 2012 or September 2013 bear on no issue
presented in the pleadings below.
The Kincaids cryptically allege that an issue on appeal was that “two earlier sales in 2012

& 2013 happen without any explanation, postponement or reason. 2013 confirmed by employer.
No auction.” These facts (and any claims which flow from them) were not raised in the district
court below, and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See The Watkins Co., LLC, supra.
The argument section of the Kincaids’ opening brief perhaps expand on the significance,
in their minds, of these facts. They make their only citation to any authority by tying these sale
dates to a “ref. Idaho Statute 45-1601 of The Idaho Consumer Protection Act.”
To the extent that the Kincaids now allege a violation of the Consumer Foreclosure
Protection Act, it is plain that it must be rejected out of hand in this appeal as it was not raised in
the court proceedings below. Moreover, the Act by its express terms does not apply to Wells
Fargo, a national bank. See Idaho Code § 45-1604(2): “The provisions of this chapter shall not
apply to: . . . (2) Any person licensed or chartered under the laws of any state or of the United
States as a bank. . .” There is no merit to this claim, procedurally or substantively.
G.

The Kincaids Raise Claims in this Appeal Which Were Not Raised Below.
A number of the “issues” or arguments which the Kincaids raise on appeal were not

raised anywhere in the proceedings below. They should not be heard in this appeal, regardless of
any substantive merit they may have. In actuality, however, none of they have any merit
whatsoever.
1.

“[O]riginal note, required to travel with deed of trust. Didn’t.”?
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The Kincaids appear to be raising the issue of standing which was rejected by Trotter v.
Bank of New York Mellon, 152 Idaho 842, 275 P.3d 857 (2012). Moreover, the only “authority”
offered by the Kincaids for this proposition appears to be a print-out of a web page of the Nolo
Press, a company that sells various self-help legal publications and documents. The print-out is
no legal authority whatsoever. It is " well settled" that an issue on appeal will not be considered
if it is " not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument." Bowles v. Pro Indiviso,
Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 376, 973 P.2d 142, 147 (1999) (quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263,
923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)). Even where an issue is " explicitly set forth in the party's brief as one
of the bases for appeal, if it is " only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent
argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this Court." Dawson v. Cheyovich Family
Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 382-83, 234 P.3d 699, 706-07 (2010) (citing Inama v. Boise Cnty. ex rel.
Bd. of Comm'rs, 138 Idaho 324, 330, 63 P.3d 450, 456 (2003)). See also Trotter v. Bank of New
York Mellon, 152 Idaho 842, 848, 275 P.3d 857, 863 (2012). The Nolo Press print out is
certainly not “cogent argument or authority,” and it is in any event incorrect under Idaho law on
this issue.
2. “[T]wo years with no billing statements, 2012 & 2013, intentional delay”?
This issue on appeal specified by the Kincaids appears to relate (perhaps) to their
misplaced claim under Idaho Code §45-1601. Since the Kincaids fail to make any argument or
provide any authority respecting this argument, however, it should be disregarded by this Court.
Dawson, supra.
3. “[A]ffidavits signed by S.T.O.C. agents (2) simply not true statements,” and
“notary stamps with forged signatures”?
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The documents attached as Exhibit B, appear to be taken from some affidavits submitted
in the record below. It appears that the Kincaids are challenging their veracity and/or
authenticity, but they fail to make any argument explaining their challenges, and they utterly fail
to provide any authority or citation explaining why the documents relate to any issue on appeal.
They should simply be disregarded by this Court. Dawson, supra.
4. “Attorney fee’s appellant paid to attorney John Finney”
The Kincaids allude to a dispute with their attorney, either of the amount they paid him or
whether the work he did for them complied with their agreement or desires. Whatever the merits
of their dispute with Mr. Finney and/or the amounts they paid him, it was not raised in the
proceedings below, and in any event has absolutely no bearing on any issue in this appeal.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The Kincaids’ appeal – as can best be determined by even an expansive reading of their
opening brief -- presents no legitimate issues on appeal by assigning error or identifying
incorrect or improper findings of fact below. The appeal is not supported as required by Idaho
Appellate Rules, and the Kincaids fail to support any of their arguments with any proper
authority or citation. The appeal is so deficient as to be dismissed outright for failure to comply
with the Idaho Appellate Rules. It is also so deficient as to warrant an award of costs and
attorney fees to Wells Fargo pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2 and Idaho Code §12-121.
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DATED THIS r tofFebruary, 2018.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
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Kenneth C. Howell, ISB No. 3235
Attorneys for Respondent WELLS FARGO
BANK, N.A.
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